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BEYOND UNCOUNTABLE
PAOLA CATTABRIGA
. . . The fact is that such a procedure is not applicable.
Why? Because their definitions are not predicative and con-
tain within such a vicious circle I already mentioned above;
not predicative definitions can not be substituted to defined
terms. In this condition, logistics is no longer sterile: it
generates contradictions. (Jules-Henri Poincare´ 1902, [10]
211, our translation.)
Introduction
By common consent Russell’s antinomy is the reason why in Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory, there is no set which comprehends all sets. Furthermore, given any set
A, there is no set which contains all sets which are not members of A (in particular,
there is no set which is the complement of A) ([7] 40-41). In other words, given any
set A, the absolute complement of A, i.e. {x | x /∈ A}, cannot be defined and the
complement of A, can only be defined as relative to another given set. For instance,
if A is a subset of B, then the relative complement of A in B is defined by
B −A = {x ∈ B | x /∈ A}.
The existence of the relative complement is ensured by the axiom schema of the
Subsets
(1) ∀z1 . . . zn∀s∃y∀x(x ∈ y ⇐⇒ x ∈ s ∧ ϕ(x)),
where ϕ(x) is a first order well formed formula, z1, . . . , zn, x are the free variables
of ϕ(x), and y is not free in ϕ(x), which admits general comprehension only for
members x of a given set s. Indeed we are always allowed to assert
(2) ∀z∀s∃y∀x(x ∈ y ⇐⇒ x ∈ s ∧ x /∈ z),
as an instance of (1). This set y is the relative complement of z in s ([6] 23). This
premise and the following subsection are introductory to the results of Section 1. In
this abstract Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory stands for general first order set theory.
Basic setup. We refer to Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with ZF. Let us recall the
axiom of Extensionality
(3) ∀x∀y [∀z(z ∈ x ⇐⇒ z ∈ y) =⇒ x = y)],
and the other main concepts we shall be concerned with. For details see [6, 7].
x ⊆ z = ∀w (w ∈ x =⇒ w ∈ z),
P(z) = {x | x ⊆ z},
x ∼ y denotes that the sets x and y are equinumerous or equal in cardinality,
namely there exists a one to one correspondence between their elements.
x 6∼ y denotes that the sets x and y are not equal in cardinality, namely there exists
no one to one correspondence between their elements.
x <c y and x ≤c y denote respectively that the set x has cardinality properly less
than the cardinality of y, and that the set x has cardinality less than y.
Let us also recall the argumentation of the so-called Cantor’s theorem. We shall
present the version in ([9] 15), for a more detailed exposition the reader is referred
to ([1, 2],[6]).
(Cantor’s proposition). For every set A in ZF,
A <c P(A)
i.e. A ≤c P(A) but A 6∼ P(A).
That A ≤c P(A) follows from the fact that the function
x 7→ {x}
which associates with each member x of A its singleton {x} is an injection. To
complete the proof, we assume, toward a contradiction, that there exists a one to
one correspondence
g : A 7→ P(A)
which establishes that A ∼ P(A) and we define the set
(4) B =
{
x ∈ A | x /∈ g(x)
}
.
Now B1 is a subset of A and g is a surjection, so there must exist some b ∈ A such
that B = g(b) (diagonalization), and (as for each x ∈ A) either b ∈ B or b /∈ B.
(*) If b ∈ B then b ∈ g(b) since B = g(b), so that b does not satisfy the
condition which defines B, and hence b /∈ B, contrary to hypothesis.
(**) If b /∈ B, then b /∈ g(b), so that b now satisfies the defining condition for B
and hence b ∈ B, which again contradicts the hypothesis.
Thus we reach a contradiction from the assumption that the bijection g exists and
the proof is complete.
1. The relative complement
Let us read the above so-called Cantor’s theorem and connect again to (4),
i.e. the step of the definition of B within Cantor’s argumentation. As previously
observed, the relative complement can always be defined, thanks to (2). Accordingly
let us define B = A−B as the relative complement of B in A, i. e.
(5) B = {x ∈ A | x 6∈ B}.
One can easily see that
(6) B = {x ∈ A | x ∈ g(x)}.
In other words, being (5) legitimated by (2), whenever (4) is defined immediately
(6) is defined too.
1Notice that in ZF the definition of B is an example of (1), as one can easily see, B is defined
within A.
Consequently we have in ZF the following situation
g : A 7→ P(A) by assumption,
B =
{
x ∈ A | x /∈ g(x)
}
by Subset axiom,
B =
{
x ∈ A | x ∈ g(x)
}
by Subset axiom.
We can then state that B and B are subsets of A. By its definition g is a surjection
and for each x ∈ A we have either x ∈ B or x /∈ B, i.e. by (5) either x ∈ B or
x ∈ B. Let us reconsider the statement there must exist some b ∈ A such that
B = g(b) (diagonalization), within Cantor’s argumentation. If such b exists, from
B 6= B, we obtain B = g(b) ↔ B 6= g(b), i.e. B = g(b) or B = g(b) but not both.
We have then the main consequence of taking into consideration the definition of
the relative complement with respect to Cantor’s argumentation in ZF. Applying
(3) we obtain
(7) (b ∈ B ⇐⇒ b ∈ g(b)) =⇒ B = g(b),
hence by (6)
(8) B = g(b).
Moreover since b ∈ B or b ∈ B but not both, and B = g(b) or B = g(b) but not
both we have
(9) B 6= g(b).
Accordingly the assertion there must exist some b ∈ A such that B = g(b) is false.
By the axiom schema of Subsets and the axiom of Extensionality, diagonalization
can not be stated as true in ZF. Consequently (*) and (**) cannot be accomplished
and Cantor’s theorem does not hold in ZF. In fact we have only two cases
1. b ∈ B and B = g(b), then b /∈ g(b) so that b satisfies the condition in
(4) which defines B, and hence b ∈ B, accordingly
to the hypothesis;
2. b ∈ B and B = g(b), then b ∈ g(b) so that b satisfies condition in (6),
and hence b ∈ B, accordingly to the hypothesis.
We have thus established the following theorem.
Theorem 1. By the definability of the relative complement, Cantor’s proposition
does not hold as a theorem in ZF.
2. The restriction on uniqueness
Let us leave aside now Cantor’s argumentation. We assume to have a set A
already defined in ZF. By the axiom schema of the Subsets we have
(I) ⊢ZF (b ∈ B ⇐⇒ b /∈ g(b) ∧ b ∈ A),
which defines B as a subset of A. Since b ∈ A is true we obtain
(II) ⊢ZF (b ∈ B ⇐⇒ b /∈ g(b)).
Furthermore by the axiom of Extensionality and the underlying laws for identity
(∀z(x ∈ z ⇐⇒ y ∈ z)⇐⇒ x = y, [7] 25, 28)
(III) ⊢ZF (b ∈ B ⇐⇒ b ∈ g(b)) ⇐⇒ B = g(b),
and therefore
(IV) ⊢ZF (b ∈ B ⇐⇒ b /∈ g(b)) =⇒ B 6= g(b),
so that by (II) and (IV)
(V) ⊢ZF B 6= g(b).
Let us state in ZF
(VI) B = g(b),
then we attain
(VII) ⊢ZF B = g(b) ∧ B 6= g(b),
accordingly ZF turns out to be inconsistent. In simple terms, to state diagonal-
ization, B = g(b), as true makes ZF inconsistent. There is no need to yield diag-
onalization within the contest of a reasoning or argumentation. A definition like
(I) leads to contradiction in any case. The explanation can be provided by the
theory of definition which states the conditions and restrictions for defining proper
equivalence in mathematics (see for example [11] 151-173). Definition (I) neglects
a restriction embodied in the rules for proper definitions, established on the basis
of the criterions of eliminability and non-creativity. Exactly as Russell’s antinomy,
definition of B drops the restriction on uniqueness, which is given when defining a
new operation symbol (or a new individual constant, i.e. an operation symbol of
rank zero) [4]. An equivalence like
O(x1 . . . xn) = y ⇐⇒ Φ
introducing a new operation symbol O, is a proper definition only if the formula
∃!yΦ
is derivable from the axioms and preceding definitions of the theory ([11] 158-
159). In ZF the uniqueness is ensured by the axiom of Extensionality (3), which
implies that there exists at most, one set y, which contains exactly those elements
x which fulfill the condition ϕ(x) in (1) ([7] 31). If B and g(b) are two sets each
of which contains exactly those elements b which fulfil the condition b ∈ g(b),
then B and g(b) are equal, see (III). Accordingly, there exists at most, one B,
such that b ∈ g(b). Definition (I) implying B 6= g(b), (IV) and (V), neglects the
restriction on uniqueness established by Extensionality and therefore the relative
consistency embodied in the criterion of non-creativity ([11] 155; [4]). This explains
why Extensionality blocks the derivation of the existence of some b ∈ A such that
B = g(b) in Cantor’s argumentation. Moreover, this fulfils the criterion established
by an editor, according to which, to attack an argument, you must find something
wrong in it. We showed indeed that the definition of B, neglecting the restriction
on uniqueness, is always wrong in ZF and therefore a wrong object sentence in
Cantor’s argumentation [8].
When this results are regarded together with those presented in [3, 5] it arises
clearly a similitude. If a set, or a predicate, is object of diagonalization then the
definition of its complement leads to the invalidity of the diagonalization itself. In
Section 3 we shall apply this code of behavior to Cantor’s diagonal argument.
3. Cantor’s diagonal argument
In 1891 Cantor presented a striking argument which has come to know as Can-
tor’s diagonal argument [2]. It runs as follows.
Consider the two elements m and v. Let M be the set whose elements E are
sequences < x1, x2, . . . , xv, . . . > where each of x1, x2, . . . , xv, . . . is either m or w.
Cantor’s proposition If E1, E2, . . . , Ev, . . . is any simply infinite sequence of
elements of the set M , then there is always an element E0 of M which corresponds
to no Ev.
To prove this proposition, Cantor arranged a denumerable list of elements in an
array.
E1 =< a1,1, a1,2 . . . , a1,v, . . . >
E2 =< a2,1, a2,2 . . . , a2,v, . . . >
. . . . . . . . .
E =< aµ,1, aµ,2 . . . , aµ,v, . . . >
. . . . . . . . .
Each aµ,v is either m or w. Cantor defined a sequence b1, b2, b3, . . . , where each
element is m or w, and, if av,v = m then bv = w, and if av,v = w then bv = m. Let
E0 =< b1, b2, b3, . . . >. Then no Ev corresponds to E0, by reason that bv 6= av,v.
E1, E2, . . . , Ev, . . . is any simply infinite sequence of elements of the set M , so
that we can think to a definite infinite sequence of elements of M as follows.
E∗1 =< a
∗
1,1, a
∗
1,2 . . . , a
∗
1,v, . . . >
E∗2 =< a
∗
2,1, a
∗
2,2 . . . , a
∗
2,v, . . . >
. . . . . . . . .
E∗ =< a∗
µ,1, a
∗
µ,2 . . . , a
∗
µ,v
, . . . >
. . . . . . . . .
Each a∗
µ,v
is either m or w and if aµ,v = m then a
∗
µ,v
= w, if aµ,v = w then
a∗
µ,v
= m. Then bv = a
∗
v,v
and E0 is never different on the v-th coordinate, so that
it could even be for some E∗
v
that
E∗
v
= E0.
Since E∗1 , E
∗
2 , . . . E
∗ . . . is a simply infinite sequence of elements of M , previous
Cantor’s proposition is false.
In both the cases of Cantor’s power set theorem and Cantor’s diagonal argu-
ment, the definition of the complement of the object of diagonalization leads to the
rejection of the diagonalization itself.
Working on logical complementation, Section 4, gives proof of the Axiom of
Choice in ZF, and its refutation in a framework which is no longer ZF, on the basis
of the universal validity of the first order logical truths.
4. The Axiom of Choice
Let us consider the following first order logic formula
(10) ∀z ∀y ∀x
[
(x ∈ y ⇐⇒ x ⊆ z
)
⇐⇒ (x /∈ y ⇐⇒ ¬(x ⊆ z))
]
.
One can easily see it is a logically valid formula. We can then assume (10) holds in
ZF (Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, [7]). From a comparison with the classical Axiom
of Power Set
(11) ∀z ∃y ∀x
(
x ∈ y ⇐⇒ x ⊆ z
)
where y is P(z), the power-set of z, it follows immediately that (10) holds for the
power-set because of its logical validity. We can then assume that (10) establishes
the definition of P(z) as inseparable from the definition of its complement. We
could think of P(z) as defined by
(12) ∀z ∃y ∀x
(
x ∈ y ⇐⇒ ¬(x ⊆ z)
)
.
Let us recall the Axiom of Choice as defined in ([7] 39-40, 53-55), to which the
reader is referred for details.
(AC) If t is a disjointed set which does not contain the null–set, its outer product
OPt is different from the null–set.
In other words, among the subsets of
⋃
t there is at least one whose intersection
with each member of t is a singleton.
OPt exists only if P(
⋃
t), the set of the subsets of the union of t, exists. Imme-
diately, by (10), AC is true, since, if t does not contain the null–set, P(
⋃
t) is never
disjointed, and therefore there are selection sets of t and OPt is different from the
null–set.
The reasons lie in the logical structure of (10), which states P(z), namely y, to
be a set excluding those parts x for which ¬ (x ⊆ z) holds (see the component
(x /∈ y ⇐⇒ ¬ (x ⊆ z)) in (10)).
Let us consider (10), with ∅ /∈ z. ¬ (x ⊆ z) is true if (z ⊂ x) ∨ (x ∩ z = ∅),
hence P(z) is constructed in such a way that x and z are never disjointed (since
(¬(z ⊂ x) ∧ ¬(x ∩ z = ∅)) holds for P(z) by (10)).
Now, consider t in AC. ∅ /∈ t, hence all the members of P(
⋃
t) are never dis-
jointed, also if t is disjointed. Consequently OPt is different from the null–set.
The opposite holds for P , because the members of P(
⋃
t) are always disjointed,
and even if t does not contain the null–set, its outer product is equal to the empty
set. To visualize how P gives rise to this situation, we can consider the following
logically valid formula
(13) ∀z ∀y ∀x
[
(x ∈ y ⇐⇒ ¬(x ⊆ z)) ⇐⇒ (x /∈ y ⇐⇒ ¬¬(x ⊆ z))
]
.
Since ∅ /∈ z, we can think of y as excluding those parts x such that x ⊆ z (and
¬((z ⊂ x) ∨ (x ∩ z = ∅))). Thus for the parts x of y it holds always (x ∩ z = ∅).
To summarize we have proved that
[(1) and P(z)] =⇒ AC [(4) and P(z)] =⇒ not AC.
We can then assert the following theorems.
Theorem 2. The Axiom of Choice holds by (10).
Theorem 3. The negation of the Axiom of Choice holds by (13) (if P is defined).
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